BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

OCT 1 0 1995

SECRETARY, BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING

DIV. OF OIL, GAS & MINING

IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST FOR RE-HEARING AND MODIFICATION OF ORDER DATED JUNE 13, 1995, BY UTAH BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION AND APPEAL OF DIVISION DETERMINATION TO APPROVE SIGNIFICANT REVISION TO PERMIT TO ALLOW MINING OF TANK SEAM BY CO-OP MINING COMPANY BY PETITIONERS NORTH EMERY WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, HUNTINGTON-CLEVELAND IRRIGATION COMPANY, AND CASTLE VALLEY SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT, CARBON COUNTY, UTAH.

CAUSE NO. ACT/015/025-93B

DOCKET NO. 94-027

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1995, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:00 A.M., A HEARING WAS HELD IN THE ABOVE MATTER BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS, AND MINING, 355 WEST NORTH TEMPLE, 3 TRIAD CENTER, SUITE 520, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84180-1203.

INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS
5980 South Fashion Blvd.
Murray, Utah 84107
801 263-1396

FILE NO. 92795

REPORTED BY: KELLY SOMMERVILLE, CSR, RPR ORIGINAL

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September 27, 1995

10:00 a.m.

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. LAURISKI: Good morning. Welcome to the September hearing for the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. We have two agenda items on the docket today, and we'll go ahead and jump right in.

The first agenda item is in Docket Number 94-027, Cause No. ACT/015/025-93B -- Request for Re-Hearing and Modification of an Order Dated June 13, 1995, by the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining in the Matter of the Request for Agency Action and Appeal of Division Determination to Approve Significant Revision to Permit to Allow Mining of Tank Seam by Co-Op Mining Company by Petitioners North Emery Water Users Association, Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company, and Castle Valley Special Service District, Carbon County, Utah. This matter was continued from our August 23 hearing.

Before we start in some of the discussions, this board is simply going to consider the matter for your request for re-hearing in a modification of the order. That doesn't mean we're here to take new evidence. We're here to decide whether or not we should grant you a re-hearing and a modification to the existing order. And hopefully we can confine the arguments to that specific request of the Water Users.

And with that, I would ask counsel to announce their 1 2 appearance for the record, please. MR. APPEL: Jeffrey Appel on behalf of Castle 3 4 Valley. Craig Smith on behalf of North Emery 5 MR. SMITH: Water Users and Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company. 6 7 MR. MITCHELL: Tom Mitchell on behalf of the 8 Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. 9 MR. HANSEN: Mark Hansen on behalf of the Co-Op 10 Mining Company. MR. LAURISKI: I would ask counsel if they agree 11 with the chair's reading of this request that we're not 12 13 here to consider new facts. We're here to consider the facts that are presented in the order that was given as 14 15 a result of the hearing. 16 MR. MITCHELL: The state is in agreement. 17 MR. LAURISKI: Okay. 18 MR. HANSEN: Co-Op Mining agrees. 19 MR. APPEL: We agree, your Honor. 20 MR. SMITH: We do as well, Mr. Chairman. MR. LAURISKI: Thank you very much. And with that, 21 22 do you want to proceed? Thank you. In its brief, Co-Op 23 MR. APPEL: suggested that there is no right of re-hearing, which is 24

one of the fundamental purposes we're here for today.

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And they rely upon rule 645-301-212-300, which within its text does not require a re-hearing.

Our view on that is that the general provisions contained in and set forth in rule 641 et seq. would control. Specifically, 641-110 governing re-hearing. The reason for that, the scope of these particular general rules indicate that they will govern all proceedings before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining or any hearing examiner designated by the board. These rules provide the procedures for formal adjudicated proceedings. The rules for informal adjudicated proceedings are under coal program rules, oil, gas and conservation rules, and the mineral rules. This is certainly a proceeding before the board.

As to our request for a re-hearing and modification of existing orders, it discusses the time for filing, any person affected by a final order, which this surely is, or decision of the board may file a petition for re-hearing. Unless otherwise provided, a petition for re-hearing must be filed no later than the 10th day of the month following the day of signing of the final order or the decision for which the re-hearing is sought.

It is our view that this general statement concerning procedure will govern in this particular

instance. I will add that before filing this, we telephoned Mr. Anders, your former counsel, and discussed this with him, and he indicated he would follow these particular procedures. So it was additionally on reliance of those conversations with him.

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On to the more substantive aspect for this and the reason for the request. This particular proceeding we went through before was noticed as a review of the tank seams. Initially, before we reached any substance or took any evidence, you entertained motions as to relevance, collateral estoppel. We submitted that the evidence would be produced on a contextual and background basis. This would have to do with the legality.

The board has later ruled in its order that the Blind Canyon seam's stratigraphy in much of this was irrelevant and not necessary to its determination regarding the tank seam, with which I tend to agree. But the background certainly would have been useful.

To remind you, there were countless objections to the introduction of that evidence throughout. I can state affirmatively to you their evidence was tailored, and our cross-examination was reduced to those limited purposes. You folks limited the field to the tank

seam.

If we knew we were adjudicating the lower stratigraphy and the effect of the movement of water in the blind canyon seam, then our case would have been entirely different. But it was limited by agreement of us, by a statement by the board, which is in the transcript, and basically by stipulation of counsel. We thought we understood what we were producing.

The renewal proceedings for that particular mine are upcoming. Our concern is that these findings which were not necessary, and you've ruled were irrelevant with respect to the blind canyon seam, will bind us in the renewal proceedings. We don't think this is fair. We have an entirely different case ready to present to those particular proceedings. And there will be a far, far more thorough cross-examination of their experts.

The cross-examination that I personally undertook was to attempt to show you that their theories didn't work in general to effect their credibility. But I would have spent far more time with them on specific theories if I'd known we were dealing with the hydrology within that lower mine. And, again, that wasn't noticed.

So in summary, we believe you initially limited the field of inquiry by the terms of your own notice, by the

stipulations of counsel, by the board chairman and the board's statement at the beginning of the hearing as to what we were going to consider, and by the terms of the order itself.

The problem is that in this order you've gone beyond that, entered the field you limited, used evidence that you ruled is irrelevant, and affected the subject matter that's more properly a part of a pending proceeding in the case in the renewal of the lower mine. We don't believe you have the jurisdiction to do that, and we would be horribly prejudiced if you do. Thank you.

MR. LAURISKI: Thank you.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, if I could just add just briefly to Mr. Appel's comments. What we're here for today is, I think, where we made it fairly clear, we're not here asking to re-open and re-hear this whole thing. Sure it's a request for a re-hearing modification. We believe there just needs to be a modification of the board's ruling.

I guess we understand that where the board's coming from in the ruling. We certainly believe that there was a broader scope that needed to be looked at, and we've lost on that issue. And we understand that. We're not here to try to re-open everything, other than the fact just to make corrections in the ruling that we think are

necessary because of the jurisdictional limits the board has placed on itself.

As Mr. Appel stated, throughout the hearing there was questions and concerns by the board about the scope of its jurisdiction in this matter. And those were raised and we argued what we believed the scope of jurisdiction was, and what should be looked at. But ultimately it's for this board to determine what its jurisdiction is. And the board's made that determination, and we can certainly live with that and understand that ruling.

What we can't live with and understand is once that jurisdictional determination is made, it's for the board then to go beyond its own determination of its jurisdiction, and make findings outside of that, what it perceives to be its jurisdiction. It's somewhat of a technical matter, but I think a very important matter. Threshold determination of any board or court is to determine what its jurisdiction is, what things are properly before it that it can rule on.

The board's made that determination. We understand that, and like I said, we can live with that. That's your job as the board is to make that threshold initial determination. However, once that determination is made, matters that fall outside of what you determine to

be your jurisdiction, are not properly included as part of your ruling to make factual findings. The reason it is, is if you don't have jurisdiction, you have no basis to make any further findings other than, we don't have jurisdiction.

So we have pointed out certain portions of the memorandum that we believe fall outside of the self-determined jurisdiction of this board. I just point out the board's ruling. The board, therefore, does not believe it is relevant to consider the hydrologic impacts of existing mining in the permit area. That's the determination that's made, yet then the ruling goes on to make factual findings in that area.

And I guess it's our bottom-line position on this thing, and we think it's well supported by the case law support provided in our brief and in the rules of this board, is that once that jurisdictional ruling is made, everything that falls outside of the jurisdiction, that you determine falls outside of your jurisdiction for that hearing, becomes irrelevant and should not be included in your findings of facts or conclusions of law.

And so what we're here for today is simply to ask that you modify your findings of fact and conclusions of

law. That those matters that were outside of the issues that you believe were properly before you and which you had jurisdiction to rule be deleted from that ruling.

And as Mr. Appel said, there are other opportunities for us to have the review of those things, and when it's properly before the board, we'll raise those.

What we don't want to be is in a position, which we think is an error of law, is to both say, We don't have jurisdiction to rule on this, but by the way, here's our ruling on this. And that's, you know, in a nutshell, that's our position. And that's what we're here for to ask today, to save everyone time and effort and clarify, and bring your ruling within the jurisdiction that you've determined. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. LAURISKI: Thank you. Before you start, Mr. Mitchell, I have a question just so I'm clear and hopefully that this makes it very clear to the board. I have a question in that we're here to talk about seeking the board to modify its order. As I understand, you're asking the board to modify its order to consider only evidence that's relevant to mining of the tank seam.

MR. APPEL: That's correct.

MR. LAURISKI: Okay. The next question is, is what purpose then would we gain from a re-hearing? What would you intend to do by re-hearing this matter?

That's part of your request here now.

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MR. APPEL: The request for re-hearing is to simply point out to you the paragraphs that we think should be deleted and excised from your order.

MR. LAURISKI: Okay. All right. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell?

MR. MITCHELL: Mr. Chairman, members of the board, I think we can all agree on one thing, that had this been the position of the petitioners to begin with, we would have been here considerably less time when we last considered this matter. My recollection, and I have seen nothing in the pleadings from my review of the record to convince me otherwise, is that the only stipulation that eventually was reached by counsel, or agreement was reached by counsel in those long hours, was that there was apparently no water in the tank seam, and any appreciable amount that could be impacted. had indeed that stipulation been before the board, and this position of the petitioners' been before the board, I would submit the entire hearing would have taken place in under ten minutes. But that was not the position. And I still don't think it's the position of the petitioners.

The position of the petitioners is they have a theory of the case, and their theory of the case makes

relevant the dewatering of the Blind Canyon seam. They said not once, but numerous points, every time there was an objection raised by either Co-Op's counsel or myself, or a question raised by the board as to why we were talking about the Blind Canyon seam, that the basis, the theory of the damage that they would suffer because of mining in the tank seam would be that the Blind Canyon seam would continue to be dewatered. And all of the evidence that they put on, their expert testimony was directed not at the tank seam, it was directed at dewatering in the Blind Canyon seam.

Two points I hope you remember from that hearing.

One was, when that was stated about as clearly as could possibly be stated by Mr. Smith, which I've quoted in my response of pleading, I remember Chairman Lauriski saying, I understand.

The other point I hope you will recall is that the consistent position of the division and Co-Op, you may recall, the division, in reliance upon what it thought was the narrow issue, did not intend to put on any testimony about the Blind Canyon seam. We asked for a recess where we tried to figure out, because we couldn't get any stipulation or clear evidentiary ruling at the time, as to whether information concerning the Blind Canyon seam was going to be relevant.

Indeed, the board's ruling was, we will only not consider that evidence related to the Blind Canyon seam, that's not relevant to the activities in the tank seam. Now, the board has issued an order directly related to the plaintiffs' petitioners' theory of the case which is, if mining takes place in the tank steam, the Blind Canyon seam will continued to be dewatered.

If you, now at this point, determine that the petitioners should change their theory of the case, should throw out all evidence relevant to the theory of their case, I think you do a disservice to yourselves and to the resources of everyone involved in this matter.

The narrow issue in front of you is, do you have jurisdiction to consider the facts that were in front of you concerning dewatering of the mine seam, of the Blind Canyon seam, while mining continues in the tank seam? That was their theory, they asked to put it on, you allowed them to put it on, we ended up responding to it, and you have a ruling which is clearly within your subject matter jurisdiction to the extent that dewatering of the Blind Canyon seam is not relevant to mining in the tank seam. Then I think your order adequately takes care of that. The reach of your order only goes as far as their requested relief and their

theory of the case.

Your order, I believe, is well within your jurisdiction. You certainly had the basis in front of you to make findings of fact given that your record totally supports your decision. And the creation of that record was not of your own making. The creation of that record was put before you by the parties based upon the plaintiffs' theory of the case, which the plaintiffs apparently, I think one has to concede, are entitled to their theory of the case. Thank you.

MR. LAURISKI: Thank you. Mr. Hansen?

MR. HANSEN: I agree with most of what Mr. Mitchell has stated. I have a couple of differing views on some of the matters. The way I view this case, the respondents proceeded forward on two different theories. The first theory, as Mr. Mitchell said, that mining the tank seam would allow Co-Op Mining to continue to mine in the Big Bear seam. That their springs were being impacted by that mining activity in Big Bear, and allowing the mining of the tank seam would continue to allow that activity to take place, which itself was the impact that they were objecting to.

They also proceeded forward on a second theory, which was that mining of the tank seam would itself impact their springs. And they presented their evidence

on that case. A good part of that evidence was that mining the tank seam would allow contaminants to be introduced into the aquifer, that those contaminants would eventually migrate into the Big Bear seam, and from there would impact their springs.

And so they were proceeding on two different theories of the case. And as I read the Court's ruling on the relevance of the evidence, the way I see it, the Court, or the board, ruled that the evidence was not relevant under the first theory of the case, because Co-Op Mine would be allowed to continue mining the Big Bear seam in any event. But that that evidence was relevant on the issue of whether the mining of the tank seam itself would directly impact their springs.

There was evidence presented on that issue. Their own expert testified that the mining of the tank seam would allow contaminants to be introduced into the aquifer, that those contaminants would migrate or dip down into the current workings in Big Bear, and from there into their springs.

Co-Op Mine presented evidence showing that that was not the case. If -- even if accepting the respondents' argument, and in light of the board's ruling on the relevance of that evidence, that evidence is not relevant to prove the first theory. It is relevant to

prove or disprove the second theory. And I believe the board so found and made its findings based on that point.

The respondents have said that had they understood what was really going on in the hearing, they would have presented their case much differently. Specifically, Mr. Appel said that he would have cross-examined Co-Op Mine's witnesses much differently. I personally don't find that argument to be too credible. The respondents had every possible incentive to discredit Co-Op Mine's experts every way they could, and to present as much evidence as they had on the case. There was an exhausting amount of evidence presented.

Aside from the general statement that was made by Mr. Appel, the respondents haven't even suggested, much less proffered, what evidence would be different had they proceeded in the manner that they suggest, or how that evidence may have changed the board's findings or rulings.

I've raised some waiver and estoppel arguments in my brief. I believe those issues have been adequately briefed, and don't intend to go over them at this point. I would point out, again, the central point that I raised in my brief, which is that the board is required by law to make findings of fact and conclusions

of law adequate to support their decisions. And I've cited the case law that's put on this record, Adams versus Board of Review, 821 Pacific 2d 1, which outlines what an administrative board's obligations are regarding the making of findings of facts. And the board not only has the right, it has the obligation to make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical, subordinate, factual issues are highlighted, and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions.

I would submit that that is exactly what the board has done here; that those findings are relevant to the respondents' second theory of the case as I have outlined; that they're entirely within the board's jurisdiction to make those findings and the board's order should stand as it now exists. Thank you.

MR. LAURISKI: Thank you, Mr. Hansen. Any response gentlemen?

MR. APPEL: Yes. Thank you. I'm somewhat confused. Well, I guess I'm not confused, because there's a possibility that something can come from the prior order that wasn't intended. Let me quote you Mr. Mitchell's view about the jurisdiction of what we were considering.

Consequently, the narrow issue in front of the board today is whether or not the information is relevant to new activity in the tank seam. I would submit that if the evidence reflects upon existing mining within the existing permit, within the existing coal seam, that the evidence is not relevant unless it can be shown the mining in the tank seam will change. Not just that we have opinions about the tank seam based upon what occurred in existing mining of the lower seam, but that mining in the tank seam will make a difference in the effect on that interest. Otherwise, the objection really goes to the existing permit. And that's not what this thing has been noticed up about, which concerns the interrelationship between evidence on the Blind Canyon seam in the lower stratigraphy, and the mining in the tank seam. What the case was about at that time, were impacts created on our springs by the tank seam, which the board has determined did not exist. That required some findings which have gone far beyond that.

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Continuing with Mr. Mitchell, on page 14, Otherwise we're re-opening the issue of whether or not the permit should have been renewed for existing mining within the existing seam. Well, we were told we weren't going to do that. We agreed we wouldn't do that, and I'll tell you where we said that.

The board, after hearing these arguments, quoting Mr. Lauriski, Given the motion and the board's order, we find the timeliness motion to be granted basically. Thereby that resolves the issue of collateral estoppel. However, I want to point out in the board's deliberations that the issue before us today relates to the significant revision of the mining permit issue to Co-Op in early July of this year. And the board in its deliberations determined that we would only consider evidence as it relates to the impact of the mining of the tank seam.

However, if the petitioners needed to lay foundation by raising issues that related to current mining and the negative impacts, they can show that relationship as it exists, as it might impact the tank seam. Just for the record, I want to read in how this was noticed so that everybody understands the framework for which we'll conduct this hearing. The purpose for this proceeding will be for the board to consider the objection of the petitioner to the division for the determination of approving all mining companies' significant revision to extend its mining operations in the tank seam. That is also what appears in the petitioners' motion for this hearing. And so that's how we're going to conduct the hearing, by narrowing that focus as it relates to the

tank seam and impacted mining on the tank seam, okay?

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At that point, we went around and it came back to me and I stated, Thank you. I think it is important to create the context to review this particular issue. I think the board did fairly resolve the procedural issue. We weren't arguing with you about that at that point. We suggested to you that it might get larger. You told us it would not. This was early on in the hearing before a witness was called. Our field was limited. Our case was constrained. What this is about today, is the case we were allowed to present. were objections all the way through the cross-examination concerning the relevancy. I remember Mr. Lauriski stating to me, How does this relate to the tank seam? And I told him that it would. Throughout this, our entire presentation was limited, and we agreed to that limitation up front.

To suggest that we're adjudicating on finding facts and conclusions concerning the lower stratigraphy simply isn't fair. We haven't had our day before you on that. And I really don't care how Mr. Hansen views the next hearing, because I can tell you, and I have told you, that it would be entirely different. You will have additional evidence. There are other witnesses we would call, because it was simply background and contextual.

We used their witnesses. We used one of ours. It's a different issue and it's a different set of facts of what's coming in a matter of months on the renewals.

And we're entitled to present our case on that.

The problem we have with the order is it constrains us and could be used against us. And it was beyond the jurisdiction of what you had.

In summary, it was about the tank seam and its impacts on us. It wasn't about the Blind Canyon seam. It wasn't about how water moves through the Blind Canyon seam. That's not critical to your findings.

Now, the cases Mr. Hansen cites, says that critical subordinate factual issues can be used. These aren't critical to the tank seam. All you need to know is where the water goes through the tank seam and if it hurts. The context we presented it in was because there was an artificial connection created by Co-Op, the ramp, which then turned into a shaft. They're taking the coal out the lower seam. That's the tie between those two seams. That's the only tie. Perhaps that's the basis of confusion that relates to the two because they're taking the coal out.

Therefore, one of the issues became, will any water move down that artificial connection? We've talked about that. You've resolved that against us. We can

live with that. If there are any questions, I'd be happy to answer them.

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MR. LAURISKI: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Appel.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I have a question. Just a moment ago, Mr. Smith I think it was, says that you were not asking for a re-hearing, but a modification of the order that was published; is that correct?

MR. SMITH: We're not asking to re-hear this issue. What we're asking is to modify the order. Now, if you need a hearing for us to point out what we think we have in our briefs pointed out, the facts that we believe should be deleted, we're happy to come and present that. But that's all we're trying to present. We're not trying to re-open the whole issue. That's correct.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's where I got confused, because Mr. Appel was just talking about a re-hearing.

MR. APPEL: What I'm speaking about is that the renewal of the permit for the Blind Canyon seam is upcoming several months in the future, I believe.

That's the time when that ought to be done. That's when we'll present our case on that. But, no. I'm sorry if I've confused you. The only thing we're asking for is modifications of your order. To the extent we could assist you with a hearing, we'd be happy to do that.

I'm sorry for the confusion.

MR. LAURISKI: Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would submit to this board that whatever theories we have are irrelevant. That this board determines the jurisdiction and this board has determined the jurisdiction. The arguments of the division and Co-Op regarding what our theories are really have no relevance once you rule on your jurisdiction of what you are going to look at, and you made that ruling. That's in points 4 and 6, in conclusions 4 and 6. And if I can just read from the ruling of this board, and that sets the jurisdiction, not what I may argue or not what theories I may have. What sets the jurisdiction of the board is the board itself.

And in conclusion of law number 4 in your ruling,

Co-Op's application for significant permit revision

involved only a proposal to mine the tank seam. Co-Op's

current operations in the Blind Canyon seam are

authorized under the terms of Co-Op's existing permit,

which has not been challenged in this proceeding.

You've ruled on your jurisdiction. And all we're saying is make the rest of your ruling consistent with your jurisdictional ruling. That's all we ask. That's all we ask for. The case law we pointed out, I think is very clear, that once you make a jurisdictional ruling,

only matters within the jurisdiction of the board can be part of that ruling.

Once something is determined to be outside of your jurisdiction by you, that's the last ruling you can make on that issue because it's outside of your jurisdiction. You don't have jurisdiction to make future rulings, and that's what we're concerned about. You know, obviously we thought other things were important at the hearing and we tried to bring those in in the context that Mr. Appel said. But that's not relevant. What's relevant is you've made a ruling on jurisdiction. We're just asking that you make the rest of your ruling consistent with your jurisdictional ruling.

And what we've argued and what our theories were have no relevance to this. The only thing that's relevant is you've ruled on jurisdiction. We're here saying, We're willing to live by that ruling. We have to live by it, unless we appeal it. We're not interested in appealing that ruling of jurisdiction. We see the points you've made and that's the ruling. We're here saying, That's fine. Let's just make everything else in the conclusions and findings consistent with your jurisdictional ruling. And that's the law on that matter, and matters outside of your jurisdiction are not

appropriate to be determined, either factually or legally by this board once you've said that they're outside of your jurisdiction. You've made that ruling and we just ask that you make it consistent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. LAURISKI: Thank you, Mr. Smith. The board will recess now, and we'll begin our deliberations. If it looks like we're going to be delayed, I'll come out and let you know. If not, we'll try to get back to you with an answer here shortly.

(A short break was taken.)

MR. LAURISKI: Okay. We're going back on the record. The board has considered the petitioners' requests and have considered the arguments, and the board has reached a majority opinion to deny the petitioners' request for re-hearing and modification in this matter. And with that, we'll turn our attention to the next issue. Thank you, gentlemen.

MR. MITCHELL: Will there be an order prepared?

MR. LAURISKI: Yes. I'll ask the board's counsel to prepare an order.

(Whereupon the matter was concluded.)

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5	I, KELLY SOMMERVILLE, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
6	Registered Professional Reporter, and notary public
7	within and for the county of Salt Lake, State of Utah de
8	hereby certify:
9	That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me
LO	at the time and place set forth herein, and was taken
L1	down by me in shorthand and thereafter transcribed into
L2	typewriting under my direction and supervision.
L3	That the foregoing pages contain a true and correct
L4	transcription of my said shorthand notes so taken.
L5	In Witness Whereof, I have subscribed my name this
L6	9TH day of October, 1995.
L7	
L8	Lelisommerville
L9	KELLY SOMMERVILLE, RPR CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
0 0	My Commission Expires:
21	June 22, 2998
22	KELLY SOMMERVELLE
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